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A Postmortem Examination of the Kerner
Commission Report: Discussion
Professor Ford has reviewed the Report of the Commission
on Civil Disorders and has found it to be wanting. He cites
as its specific deficiencies: (1) it did not provide cost
estimates which precluded its use as a planning guide; (2) it
neglected to consider the interaction of its piecemeal recommenda-
tions which permitted charges of redundancy; and (3) it failed
to assign priorities which denied politicians a basis for com-
promise in the implementation of its recommendations. In addition,
he charges that the Commission in general has failed to propose
any remedies to meet the primary cause that it assigned for
the civil disorders: "white racism." He says:
If, as Professor Briggs put it, the "main culprit"
identified by the Commission is "white racism"--
one searches the Report in vain for a program aimed
directly at producing changes in attitudes toward
the race question. (Emphasis is in the original text.)
Let me begin with the general issue. It is difficult--
to put it mildly--to understand how one can conclude that the
panopoly of recommendations offered by the Commission represents
a non sequitur from its causal premise. This accusation
seriously misinterprets the entire goal of public policy in
the equal opportunity area. Moreover, it mis-reads the indict-
ment tendered by the Commission. The Report does not claim
that all whites are racists and that the problem is one of
2changing the collective attitudes of individual whites. Rather,
the Commission concluded that it is the institutions that
dominate our society--the corporations, the unions, the political
parties, the employment service, the welfare boards, the school
boards, the city councils, the police departments, and 50 on--
which are controlled entirely by whites that are in need of
drastic reform. In the precise words of the commission:
"What white Americans have never fully understood--
but what the Negro can never forget--is that white
society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White
institutions created it, white institutions maintain:it,
and white institutions condone it." (Emphasis is my
own) .
Attitudes, on the other hand, can never be changed directly by
legislative action or moral appeals; but behavior can. It is
to this end that the Commission put forth its recommendations.
Prejudice (i.e., attitudes) does not cause discrimination
(behavior) . It is discrimination that causes prejudice. When
people find other people in a demeaning status, prejudices develop.
The fundamental objective of all equal opportunity proposals is
to halt discrlmatory practices and, thus, indirectly seek to
ameliorate prejudice. Thus, contrary to Professor Ford's general
conclusion, the recommendations put forth by the Commission are
entirely consistent with its premise that "white racism'" is
the
"
culpri t . f! Institutional reforms are prescribed to overcome
the overt and--more importantly--the covert discrimation of the
white dominated institutions of our society. Hence, it is not
surprising that one can "search" the entire volume and not find
3any proposals for attitudinal changes. Individuals tend to
reflect the normative values of their institutions; change the
institutions and you can alter the attitudes of individuals. This
is the message of the Kerner Commission.
Let us turn now to the specific criticisms. Professor
Ford has calculated the costs of selected programs proposed by
the Commission. He finds that the range for about 17 percent
of the proposals is $18-$46 billion a year and that the total
bill probably would be consistent with the $80 billion figure
that is popularly cited. I doubt that anyone would question his
calculations. They all seem reasonable. It is not clear, however,
what comes of action flows from this finding. Everyone knew
that the enactment of all-or any sizeable proportion--of the pro-
posals would be costly. The Commission outlined what it believed
to be needed, not what it thought was economically or politically
attainable. Perhaps this was stupid. But, one does not realis-
tically propose that a single fire engine be sent to a ten alarm
fire. It would be just as wise to do nothing as to expect
meaningful results from a vain effort. It would be wiser to pro-
pose that every resource available be marshalled with the knowledge
that the request will be tempered by what is available. My guess
is that no one on the Commission thought for a moment that the
package of programs would be enacted at ~ time. The Commission
did expect--and I feel most black Americans anticipated--that a
commitment would be made to establish a timetable against
~hith progrc~~ Qr ~~.ilure could be measured at periodic intervals.
4
The Commission, I feel, offered wise counsel to the Johnson
Administration and its succeeding Nixon Administration that
continuation of the inadequate "present policies" approach was
likely to be the most costly of all in the long run. It correctly
stated that such a course could not even hope to keep pace,. much
less reverse the deteriorating quality of life in our inner cities.
In this regard who can forget the apocalyptic last line in the
editorial of Harlems' Amsterdam ~ the day after the successful
moon landing last July: "Yesterday the moon, tomorrow maybe us."
It is a small wonder that Roy Wilkins labeled the mission "a
cause for shame," and added "there's something wrong with the
Government's priority system." The fact that the Report received
the chilled reception that it did was because our government leaders
recognized the truth is what was being implicitly proposed: it
is going to take billions of dollars to save our cities and their
like it is."
But the Commission cannot be blamed for "telling it
It specified the programs; it did not state the
inhabitants.
dollar equivalents. I doubt if anyone was really surprised that
when the dollars were matched with the proposals, they represent
an expensive amount.
In passing, I might add that many of the proposals cited
by the Commission would be almost costless. There is no ex-
planation offered by Professor Ford for the failure to implement
these proposals. For example, the number one cause of the dis-
orders as seen by blacks and as reported in the Commission's
findings was police brutality. Yet, I notice no groundswell of
support for the public review board proposal. Certainly it
5is ~ the cost that is the obstacle; rather it is the per-
petuation of institutional racism that explains the lack of
implementation. The same can be said for the multitude of reforms
offered to revampt the administration of Justice; or the proposals
to decentralize city government; or to make school curriculums
and textbooks more relevant to ghetto life; or to pass an enforce-
able fair housing law (note: The Civil Rights Act of 1968 did
make provisions for such a code but no funds were subsequently
appropriated for its enforcement). The list could go on but I
would suggest that the fear of the price tag was by no means the
only obstacle to adoption of the Commission's proposals.
On those few occasions when the Report does mention
costs, Professor Ford correctly points out that the semantics were
highly ambiguous. He cites such phrases as "substantial
appropriations,"
"!!!!!£hgreater scale," and "expanded manpower
programs," to make his point. My limited experience in the Wash-
ington bureaucracy a few years ago taught me a fundamental lesson.
That is, the basic tenent of political declarations is that "one
must learn to be evasive but still get his point across." The
Kerner Commission was a political body. As such, it speaks in
generalities but its point is crystal clear. It says that the
urban problems of this nation must be placed high on the national
agenda. The Commission fully expected that literally hundreds
of social science scholars and graduate students would assume
the task of deciding exactly how much should be expended on what
proposal to meet which problem. Such has certainly been the result.
6Turning to the second issue, Professor Ford asserts that
there is overlap in the recommendations. The redundancy, he
claims, has contributed to the high cost of the entire bundle.
He--unfortunately--refers to this phenomenon as tleconomic over-
kill." I would call it "excessive humanitarianism." Expressed
in my terms, I think one would qUickly conclude that in realm
of political reality there would never be such a situation. For
if the history of social legislation in the United States has t
taught any lessons, it is that such programs are never funded
at anywhere near the level of need. To believe that we could
ever have a situation in which redundancy was a problem in our
social programs is, I would submit, a dream that not even the
most bloody of "bleeding hearts" would imagine. It is only in
the towers of the theoretical abstractionist that one should
spend time worrying about problems that will never occur.
Personally, however, I strongly support the Commissions
approach of offering a broad array of remedies. The multi-
faceted problems of our cities are not amenable to any monistic
solution (including most particularly the Negative Income Tax
alluded to in the paper). The insufferable employment patterns
that now describe the labor market experience of black Americans
represent an amalogam of causal factors: job discrimination;
pervasive unemployment; segregated urban housing patterns, isolated
from growing employment opportunities in outlying areas; inferior
educational opportunities; inadequate public transportation
7systems; insufficient labor market information; and deleterious
health conditions. It will not be until all of these problems
are attacked in concert that any possible resolution of the
urban crisis can be expected. I do not see where the Commission
proffered redundant solutions; rather I feel that it correctly
concluded that it will take a total assault upon the ghettos
of America if any hope of victory is realistically to be expected.
Professor Ford's last point concerns the failure of the
Commission to assign priorities. I believe this issue is
inextricably tied to my. earlier contentions that the answers to
the racial crises confronting this Nation will require a multipli-
city of diverse and simultaneous program efforts. To try to
restructure the welfare system, for example, is a hopeless task
unless one concurrently addresses the problems of housing, health,
education, and job discrimination. These issues are interdependent.
As for the statement that the Commission's staff "blundered" by
its failure "to establish an order of priorities in the cost-
benefit sense," this charge is a red herring. During the eight
month period in which the Commission functioned, I too was in
Washington on leave from my teaching post. I served as the Re-
search Director for the Committee on the Administration of Training
Programs--a public advisory committee created by the appropriation
Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives. In the pursuit
of its mission, this Committee sought desparately to find and to
use--if possible--the knowledge of benefit-cost analysis to a
study of the vast array of manpower and poverty programs. We
8surveyed the literature; we met with the twenty members of the
Economics Faculty of the University of Wisconsin (which has
pioneered such studies); we met with the authors of several
completed studies. The net result was the clear recognition
that the state of the arts at that ~ simply precluded the
meaningful use of such ratios as policy guides. I realize
that with the current snowballing popularity of benefit-cost
analysis as topics for Ph.D. dissertations and for sponsored
research grants, to dare question the utility of such efforts
is to question the authenticity of the Bible. There is no
doubt that benefit-cost analysis can be of positive assistance
in selecting from alternative approaches a single method to
attack a previously determinant target. Benefit-cost analysis,
however, is of absolutely ~ use to public administrator's
in determining priorities between different targets. Many
politicians have unwittingly contributed to the growth of public
support for benefit-cost studies under the assumption that they
could compare the benefit-cost ratios of different programs and,
thereby, weed-out those with the smallest payoff. That such
a comparison would represent a perversion of reality can best be
seen by an example. The Job Corps--a program under constant
pUblic criticism--serves 16-21 year old youths--mostly males--
in a residential (i.e., away from home) setting through a program
designed to impart occupational skills and to develop work habits.
The Work Incentive Program (WIN)--inaugurated under 1967 amend-
ments to the Social Security Act--is designed primarily to assist
9welfare mothers to find employment. The WIN program serves
largely unmarried or deserted women and relies upon extensive
personal counseling, day care programs for children, basic
education, provides transportation to specially developed job
opportunities, and so on. Any thought of comparing a benefit-
cost ratio between Job Corps and WIN would be frivilous. Each
represents an entirely different target group and the cos t
structures required to meet their needs vary accordingly. The
target--or in Professor Ford's terminology--the "priorities"
themselves can never be determined by ratio comparisons as
implied in his paper. One can use such procedure only to com-
pare alternative methods to meet the needs of Job Corps enrollees
but never as a basis for decision between Job Corps and WIN
or any other social venture.
I might add that during my tenure in Washington, the
staff of the Kerner Commission did contact my Committee in a
vain effort to find some way to make the priority decisions
which he says they should have offered. After a long series
of meetings, they came to the same conclusion that I have Just
detailed.
In closing, I feel that no summary is necessary and, as
a discussant, my role is not to put forth my own views on the
Kerner Commission's findings. Rather, I have simply reacted
to the points proposed by Professor Ford. However, as variations
of these comments have been frequently made, I am most appreciative
of the opportunity to respond to them in public.
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Department of Economics
University of Texas at Austin
